An evolutionary ecological perspective on demographic transitions: Modeling multiple currencies by Low, Bobbi S. et al.
An Evolutionary Ecological Perspective on Demographic
Transitions: Modeling Multiple Currencies
BOBBI S. LOW,1 CARL P. SIMON,2 AND KERMYT G. ANDERSON3
1School of Natural Resources and Environment Population Studies Center, The University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
2Department of Mathematics, School for Public Policy, and Center for the Study of Complex
Systems, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
3Population Studies Center, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan
ABSTRACT Life history theory postulates tradeoffs of current versus future reproduction; today
women face evolutionarily novel versions of these tradeoffs. Optimal age at first birth is the result of
tradeoffs in fertility and mortality; ceteris paribus, early reproduction is advantageous. Yet modern
women in developed nations experience relatively late first births; they appear to be trading off
socioeconomic status and the paths to raised SES, education and work, against early fertility. Here,
[1] using delineating parameter values drawn from data in the literature, we model these tradeoffs to
determine how much socioeconomic advantage will compensate for delayed first births and lower
lifetime fertility; and [2] we examine the effects of work and education on women’s lifetime and age-
specific fertility using data from seven cohorts in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Am. J.
Hum. Biol. 14:149–167, 2002.  2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
More is known about human populations
than about populations of any other species.
In addition, with six billion humans on the
planet, and diverse and rapid changes in
demographic patterns, there is deep concern
about the ability to make and test predic-
tions about population patterns, causes, and
effects. Biologists and demographers both
study patterns of population growth, births,
and deaths––however, because they typi-
cally ask different questions, their meas-
urements tend to differ. Demography, as a
social science (Caldwell, 1996), has focused
on proximate determinates of aspects of
fertility and mortality; the importance of
such knowledge to a variety of concerns has
led to internal tensions and cross-fertiliza-
tion in various endeavors whose practition-
ers call themselves demographers (e.g.,
Kirk, 1996). In some ways, the analyses of
biologists concerned with life history theory
and patterns (Roff, 1992; Stearns; 1992;
Charnov, 1993), even those who examine
human life histories (Hill, 1993; Low, 1998)
are simpler. Although they may explore
mechanisms, they focus more on trait–en-
vironment correlations (see also Bock,
1999): Under what circumstances do par-
ticular patterns occur? The concerns involve
explaining variation in behavior as a func-
tion of ecological (including social) context;
adaptive payoffs are crucial.
In general, biologists focus on net
results as the outcomes of differing strate-
gies––aggregating influences, but disag-
gregating results, whereas demographers
disaggregate variables (birth rates and
death rates, rather than number reaching
independence, for example), and aggregate
results. It is thus sometimes hard to com-
pare, or to translate, from one mode to the
other. Both perspectives have great utility,
depending on the questions asked; they
differ in the level at which explanations are
sought––and thus their explanations are
complementary, rather than alternatives.
Combining the two levels of endeavor
could be profitable (e.g., Bock, 1999). Cer-
tainly demography is crucial to life-history
analysis. Stearns (1992, p. 20) called it the
key to life history theory, allowing us to
calculate the strength of selection on life
history traits for many conditions Life
history theory, with its generation of spe-
cific and testable hypotheses derived from
theoretical expectations, may be useful if we
can sufficiently delineate predictions for
complicated human situations.
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TRANSITIONS AND CURRENCIES
Although sociologists, demographers, and
evolutionists calculate the costs and bene-
fits of children in somewhat different cur-
rencies, and are differentially concerned
with proximate versus ultimate causality
(cf. Caldwell, 1982a,b; versus Turke, 1989,
1992; Kaplan, 1994, 1996), all are concerned
with testable hypotheses about the deter-
minants of fertility. All struggle with the
conundrum that current human popula-
tions appear to be operating under different
rules than other species or traditional hu-
man societies (e.g., Caldwell 1982a,b, 1983;
Decker and Lewis, 1974; Borgerhoff Mul-
der, 1998; Kaplan.et al., 1995; Alexander,
1979, 1987, 1988; Low, 1993; Luker, 1996;
Geronimus, 1996a,b).
In other species, despite great variation,
the evolution (including phenotypic plas-
ticity) of age-specific fertility, clutch and
litter size, and parental investment in off-
spring all appear to follow consistent rules
(Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992) Beginning with
these rules, counter-intuitive and testable
predictions can be generated. So do some
human populations. Traditional societies,
as defined by anthropologists, are typically
small-scale societies, often hunter–gather-
ers, fishers, pastoralists, horticulturalists,
or agriculturalists (whether slash-and-
burn, irrigation, or other type). Around the
world and in a variety of environments,
such societies appear to follow the rules
(e.g., Irons, 1979a,b, 1983; Chagnon, 1988;
Borgerhoff Mulder, 1987, 1988a,b, 1995;
Cronk, 1991a,b). Similarly, although data
are more sparse, 19th-century European
societies of the demographic transition that
have been examined behaved in this way
(Hughes, 1986; Rskaft et al., 1992; Voland,
1990; Voland et al., 1990; Voland and
Dunbar 1995; Clarke and Low, 1992; Low,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993; Low and Clarke.
1991, 1992, 1993).
Modern populations seem aberrant. De-
mographers have struggled for years with
the complexities of fertility transitions, and
every time a theoretical advance seemed
imminent, new trajectories emerged (Scho-
field and Coleman, 1986; Friedlander et al.,
1999). Post-transition societies appear to
have fertility that is lower and later than
any calculated optimum (Hill, 1993); and
the characteristic positive association be-
tween resource control (including wealth)
and fertility seems to be absent or reversed
in many societies (Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998;
Low, 2000a,b).
In what ways does modern human fertil-
ity require an explanation that is unique?
Interpretation is difficult. Many studies
lump as a single population groups whose
members face very different constraints
(see Low, 2000b). Studies of modern popu-
lations seldom measure variables in ways
parallel to those of other species, traditional
societies, and transition societies; fre-
quently proxies such as education are used
(see Low, 2000a,b).
Women generate their own income in new
ways today, and this affects fertility trade-
offs. It is thus important to know the source
of womens wealth: it might come from their
husbands wealth (as in 19th-century Swe-
den, when a positive relationship existed),
from womens own work (Tasiran, 1995,
positive relationship), or from inheritance
(Essock-Vitale and McGuire, 1988, positive
relationship). Nothing prevents a diversity
of strategies from coexisting, and none,
some, or all may be adaptive, depending on
circumstances. Consider a 1999 study re-
ported in the New York Times (Hass, 1999)
that compared income and fertility in nine
New York neighborhoods. In three neigh-
borhoods, wealth and family size were neg-
atively related (families with three or more
children had incomes less than 85% of the
income of families with one child). In three
neighbourhoods, the relationship was flat;
and in three neighborhoods, families with
three or more children had higher incomes
than families with one child––in one
neighborhood, three times the income of
single-child families.
Rather than expect a singular condition,
it might be more profitably ask: When and
under what conditions can each of the above
patterns be predicted to occur? A final
complication is that wealth may influence
both fertility and mortality (Geronimus,
1996b; Geronimus et al., 1996). While there
are studies that examine parts of such re-
lationships, there is little systematic treat-
ment.
This paper uses dynamic simulation
models to explore trade-offs in womens age-
specific fertility, mortality, and earnings to
construct populations in different (virtual)
environments, and compares empirical data
from real populations to examine the fit of
general life history arguments to real-world
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data. In doing so, it is suggested that line-
age persistence (Fishers [1958] m) over
time may relate to complex combinations of
variables, and not simply to classic meas-
ures of fertility and survivorship. Empirical
data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) are used to explore how the
patterns play out in one modern data set.
TRADE-OFFS AND TRANSITIONS
Despite great variation across species in
life history patterns, repeated analyses
confirm that organisms have evolved to
maximize, under constraint, their lineage
success, although (see below) defining
success––what to measure and when––is
nontrivial. Typical constraints include ef-
fect of size and age on reproductive compe-
tition and maternal success, effect of
interbirth interval on offspring success, and
so forth. Even for nonhumans, the trade-
offs are not simple, but certain predictors
are very strong (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992):
Age at first birth is most strongly pre-
dicted by extrinsic adult mortality (Stearns,
1992; Roff, 1992; Coale and Trussell, 1974,
1978), but is also constrained by energy
available and the relative profit to further
self-investment (Sibley and Calow, 1986).
The greater the adult mortality (due to ex-
trinsic factors not related to reproduction),
the earlier the age at first birth; as chances
to die before reproducing increase, optimal
age at first birth decreases (Hill, 1993; Hill
and Hurtado, 1996). Human patterns are
consistent with this pattern. In traditional
societies women are sub-fecund in their
early teens, perhaps due to the costs of
necessary further growth on limited nutri-
tion (Lancaster, 1986), and in modern pop-
ulations with high mortality rates (Rank,
1989; Geronimus, 1996a; Daly and Wilson,
1997), first births are quite early.
Litter biomass (in humans, neonatal
weight) is influenced by adult size, which
limits calorie throughput rate and controls
both adult nutritional status and biomass
possible in any reproductive bout. At a more
refined level, within species (including hu-
mans), neonatal birth weight varies with
maternal nutritional condition and health,
and is related to juvenile mortality
(Stearns, 1992; Roff, 1992).
Interbirth intervall evolves to that timing
that yields the greatest number of living
successful offspring. Too-short intervals
may decrease a mothers ability to invest
and produce insufficiently vigorous or com-
petitive offspring (e.g., Stearns 1992, Roff,
1992).
Per capita parental investment: adult ex-
trinsic mortality, offspring growth rate, and
required per capita investment for success-
ful independence all interplay to affect level,
type, and duration of parental investment.
This complicated set of relationships re-
duces to three observations. First, per cap-
ita investment declines when extrinsic
adult mortality is high, ability to invest
parentally is low or uncertain, and offspring
that require high levels of parental invest-
ment are at risk. Second, when parents can
provide significant investment, the off-
spring can reduce its own expenditures
(e.g., to feed itself) and will grow more
quickly than otherwise. Humans have
raised this strategy to a fine art, because
those other, than the mother may also feed
juveniles. Finally, when competition is
high, and heightened per capita investment
is required for offspring success, fertility
typically declines. MacArthur and Wilson
(1967) called this r- and K-selection (al-
though their concept has been seriously
perverted and misused); in other species
this is typically density -related, although it
need not be so (Low, 1993, 2000a,b). Darwin
(1871, p. 319) noted that: The only check to
a continued augmentation of fertility in
each organism seems to be either the ex-
penditure of more power and the greater
risks run by the parents that produce a
more numerous progeny, or the contingency
of very numerous eggs and young being
produced of smaller size, or less vigorous, or
subsequently not so well nurtured.
This trade-off between offspring quantity
and offspring quality has been recognized
by several disciplines, including biology
(Lessells, 1991; Smith, 1974; Stearns, 1992),
anthropology (Hill, 1993; Hill and Hurtado,
1996; Kaplan, 1996), economics (Becker,
1991; Willis, 1973), and sociology (Powell
and Steelman, 1989).
Lifetime fertility is constrained by optimal
per capita investment in offspring, optimal
interbirth interval, and adult mortality
schedules. Although within-species varia-
tion is great in humans, some of these re-
lationships vary more than others, and are
of more interest to us here. Some life-his-
tory arguments from the biological litera-
ture are too general, or phrased in
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inappropriate units for easy applicability to
humans; this weakens arguments by anal-
ogy. Consider biomass per reproductive
bout: in other species, the range of variation
is sufficient to make testing this rather
straightforward. In humans, single births
are the norm, twins are rare, and triplets
even rarer. On average, a pair of twins
weighs more than a single birth, and each
twin weighs less, fitting the general trade-
off model. The range of variation is so small
in humans that attendant costs of repro-
duction (Stearns, 1992; Roff, 1992)––twins
versus singletons––are difficult to estimate.
Yet, controlling for other factors, low-birth-
weight infants suffer higher mortality than
normal-birth-weight infants.
Here, in both the empirical data and the
models, emphasis is on age-specific mortal-
ity, age-specific fertility, and the quantity-
quality trade-off. The last two lie at the
heart of demographic transition analyses
(Becker and Lewis, 1974; Decker, 1981,
1991; Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998). Many
things can influence traits such as age-
specific fertility (Roff 1992, Table 7.3); thus
it is hardly surprising that, in different
times and places, different causal variables
have the strongest influences. In 19th cen-
tury Sweden, for example, daughters of
wealthy men tended to marry wealthy men,
and had higher age-specific fertility than
poorer women (see Low, 2000b), despite
specific variations among parishes. Daly
and Wilsons (1997) study of 30 Chicago
neighborhoods found another effect: as life
expectancy declined, women reproduced
earlier. Life expectancy itself is salient
(Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992): extrinsic adult
mortality is a strong predictor of age at first
reproduction. Daly and Wilson (1997) sug-
gested that it is also psychologically salient.
Whether conscious motivation is found in
interviews, the pattern shown with life ex-
pectancy in the Chicago neighborhoods
dramatically parallels that in other species.
In this case, household income was largely
irrelevant. The fact that different environ-
mental variables may supply the influence
in any particular case does not obviate the
general rule: age-specific fertility is influ-
enced by extrinsic pressures.
The phenotypic correlation (Lessells,
1991) can cause difficulties: even when it is
clear that, for example, energy available for
growth is unavailable for reproduction, in-
dividuals may exist that have so much
energy available that they can both grow
and reproduce more than others. Yet the
degree of difficulty caused by the phenotypic
correlation in other species pales by com-
parison to the difficulties it can cause in
analysis of human populations (e.g., Hill and
Hurtado, 1996). One could argue (Alexan-
der, 1979, that the human species literally
evolved to invent and proliferate new sce-
narios, new axes of competition. If true, this
means that effort is likely to be directed to-
ward cultural success even when it has be-
come so elaborated that it shows no pattern
with reproductive success, making analysis
difficult. Discovering what objective func-
tion (if any) people are maximizing, and how
that varies among groups, will be a complex
endeavor.
Women face harsher trade-offs than men
in resource-garnering activities, versus the
production of children and dispersal of
investment to them. Men in traditional
societies typically show reproductive ad-
vantages with status and wealth (see Low,
2000b). In traditional societies, a womans
value was typically her reproductive value:
how many children (reflected as daughters)
will she produce in the remainder of her life,
given the current age-specific fertility and
mortality patterns (Fisher, 1958)? Bride-
wealth payments in at least some tradi-
tional societies correlate with womens
reproductive value (Borgerhoff Mulder,
1988b).
In post-demographic transition societies,
successful children cost more per capita in
parental investment than they ever can
return, and women may trade reproductive
value for resource value (working and de-
laying fertility), so that one can wonder
whether wealth affects each sexs repro-
ductive success differently. Kaplan et al.
(1995) and Kaplan and Lancaster (2000)
found no relationship between wealth and
fertility for modern Albuquerque men. It is
at least theoretically possible that women
may actually profit reproductively by
spending more effort bringing in resources,
compared to filling traditional roles of child
production; certainly an increasing number
of women are behaving as if this were true.
Low fertility and costly children result.
Whether such women actually do profit
reproductively is unknown. The investment
level required to produce successful off-
spring varies with environment, and spe-
cifically with the threshold level of
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investment required for a childs success.
Required investment correlates with the
competition offspring face, whether this is
simply a density issue (MacArthur and
Wilson, 1967), an educational issue (Knodel
et al., 1990), or a labor market issue (Ka-
plan, 1996; Low et al., 1992; Low 1993,
2000b; Low et al., in press).
Are there circumstances in which rela-
tively wealthy women who have late and
low fertility have greater net lineage in-
crease or persistence than others? Fertility
is so low, and so late for modern Western
populations that it is difficult to imagine
this strategy as increasing lineage repre-
sentation or persistence, unless something
other than numbers of children (e.g., num-
bers · resources controlled) is being maxi-
mized––and such a strategy could
sufficiently reduce unpredictable extrinsic
mortality to compensate for very low num-
bers and long generation time. That is, such
lineages could only gain if they were so
protected from mortality that their persist-
ence was longer than other lineages that
produced more children, but whose children
died at a compensatory rate.
It is difficult to imagine gathering reliable
empirical data sufficient to test this possi-
bility fully. However, it can be modeled.
What level of protection afforded by re-
sources would be required for this strategy
to work under specified conditions? The
trade-offs can then be examined explicitly.
Most currently available data, gathered to
answer other questions, are inadequate
(Low, 2000a). Although it is obvious that
the problem is complex, the patterns among
womens education, womens work, and
fertility suggest that real trade-offs do exist.
Both models and more finely honed empir-
ical data, especially longitudinal data, are
needed.
MODELS AND DATA
People today face more complex repro-
ductive trade-offs than individuals in other
species or people in traditional societies. It
is not unreasonable to expect individuals to
use heuristic rules of thumb in their
choices, and to expect that such choices will
sometimes, but not always, be optimizing.
Several aspects of the relationships be-
tween resources (and education to get those
resources) and (1) completed lifetime fertil-
ity and (2) timing of fertility (age-specific
fertility) for women under different cir-
cumstances are examined. Dynamic mode-
ling is used to simulate conditions reflected
by the literature on such populations, and
to ask under what conditions, if any, de-
layed fertility can result in longer lineage
persistence and greater lineage growth,
than early fertility. As is always true, sim-
plifying assumptions are made.
Model 1
In Model 1, straightforward analyses of r,
the intrinsic rate of increase (Roff 1992,
Stearns 1992) are calculated. What shifts in
age of first reproduction, age-specific fertil-
ity, and total fertility will cause the growth
rate rs of the early- and late-reproducers to
converge? Leslie matrices were constructed
of 100 women, 12.5 each in age groups 0–5,
6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–40,
and 40–45 years. Initially, no women exist-
ed in the post-reproductive categories of
46–50, 51–55, 56–70 years. These conditions
form the basis of the following experiments.
1. Population growth rates are calculated
for a series of populations of women,
Whose reproduction was concentrated
into one 10-year period (16–24, 21–30,
24–35, 31–40 years). Total daughters
(mx) varied from 1.1 to 2.1, and surviv-
orship of those daughters in age 0–5
years varied from 1.0 to 0.45. Obviously,
some combinations of age-specific fertil-
ity are unrealistic (e.g., two daugh-
ters––and by inference two sons,
although they do not count in a life ta-
ble––born to a woman between ages 36
and 40 years). Combinations are ex-
plored of fertility at the specified age and
survivorship in the 0–5 age class that
result in equal population growth rates
for women with different generation
times.
2. In the real world, daughters may show
fertility patterns that differ from those of
their mothers. In this set of experiments,
equal numbers of women with the fer-
tility patterns explored in item 1 were
the foundresses of a single large popu-
lation. In each generation, daughters
had some probability (P) of shifting to a
fertility distribution that was earlier
(0.01 < P < 0.02) or later (0.05 < P < 0.08)
than that of their mothers. After 150 5-
year periods (750 years), the population
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was examined: What was the current
proportion of each fertility strategy, and
what proportion of the current popula-
tion descended from foundresses of each
type? These simulations explore the
longer-term effects of infant mortality
and age-specific fertility.
Model 2
In these Leslie-like models, life paths are
constructed for women who begin life under
different conditions, and facing different
constraints and trade-offs, depending on
exigencies and past decisions. Not only the
biological measures of Model 1, but social
support, education, and wealth are tracked.
The advantage of this more complicated
model is that not only population size, but
also the resources controlled by different
categories of women in each time period,
can be followed.
The currencies. Because trade-offs for
women facing different conditions are a fo-
cus, the analysis begins by holding the fer-
tility of all women equal, removing total
fertility as a variable; only age-specific fer-
tility varies. For the first of these models,
all women have just more than one daugh-
ter in one age period. Despite the com-
plexity it introduces, three currencies are
used. Each compartment includes not only
age, but also amount of social, human, and
physical capital and parental status. Social
capital, Sx (ones parents, spouse, family
and friends who can provide services), ex-
ists at two levels; it can increase in certain
age groups (e.g., marrying), and decrease in
any (loss of a parent, divorce). A loss of so-
cial capital (cf. Geronimus, 1996a,b, 1997;
Daly and Wilson, 1997) is associated with
lowered survivorship of any infants born to
such mothers.
Human capital, Hx (investment in edu-
cation and skills), exists at five levels (ele-
mentary, middle school, high school,
college, and graduate work). College incurs
a current cost, with a delayed payoff of in-
creased physical capital. Post-college edu-
cation, in this model, mimics typical
graduate work, in which the physical capi-
tal level is unlikely to change, rather than
professional school, in which significant
debt can be incurred. Everyone reaches Hx
levels 0 and 1 at age levels 0 and 1 respec-
tively, but not everyone finishes high school
(reachesHx level 3) (Fig. l). Physical capital,
Kx (ones monetary and other physical re-
sources, roughly socioeconomic status; nine
levels), increases the probability of gaining
human capital, and thus, in time, further
physical capital. For each currency, x de-
notes the age group. There is evidence in
the literature that social and resource cap-
itals are traded off in some circumstances,
and that social and human capital can in-
fluence reproductive decisions (above).
Cultural diffusion cannot as yet be incor-
porated in this model.
The women. There are approximately 900
states in which a woman can exist as de-
fined by the above currency levels. There
are seven age groups, each of the first six
approximately 5 years long: 0 = birth
through early elementary school; I = ele-
mentary school; 2 = junior high school; 3 =
high school; 4 = college age, 5 = post-college
age (late 20s); 6 = early 30s; 7 = late 30s and
beyond. There is a transition probability
of moving from one state to any other state
in a time period: for example, the probabil-
ity of gaining Hx or of surviving to the next
age group increases with level of Sx or of Kx.
Giving birth or going to college in a period
decreases Kx; otherwise women work (and
increase Kx unless they have dropped out
before finishing high school). Higher Hx
leads to comparatively larger Kx increases
in later age groups. Low Sx lowers the fer-
tility for any opportunity, as do very low
and very high Kx. (Copies of the probabili-
ties used are available from the authors.)
The transition probabilities in this model
are first estimated using published data.
Consider three populations. First, poor
women on welfare (Rank, 1989; Geronimus,
1996a,b; Daly and Wilson, 1997) are in Kx =
l–3. These women have lower survivorship
both as children and adults (there is a 13%
chance that a woman will die before age 45)
than other women––and for the daughters
of women dying early, the loss of social
capital is reflected in lowered infant sur-
vivorship. These women tend to have early
fertility, tend to be and remain poor (Corc-
oran and Kunz, 1997), and are likely, be-
cause of relatively low survivorship, to lose
members of their social network who pro-
vide social currency. Rarely do they transfer
up more than one level of physical capital.
When a pregnancy occurs early, schooling is
terminated (or disrupted, for there is some
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probability of returning to school at later
ages), and future physical capital acquisi-
tion is limited.
Second, women with typical middle-
American trade-offs occupy Kx = 4–6. They
survive very well throughout life, and are
likely to invest in acquiring both human and
physical capital. Holding their fertility very
close to are daughter (and by extension, one
son), reflects very modern developed-nation
fertility, in which r » 0. In the real world,
this is occasionally locally higher for such
women. Finally, professional women occupy
Kx = 7–9. Such professional women appear
to be becoming increasingly common (Sell-
ers, 1998). These womens fertility is typi-
cally late; their human and physical capital
levels are high. The total fertility of these
women is undoubtedly overestimated by
beginning with a lifetime fertility equivalent
to that of the other two groups. Within each
of these three broad categories, a range of
parameters is constructed (e.g., survivor-
ship is lower for Kx = 1 than Kx = 3).
The Questions. In Model 2 the additional
currencies of physical capital Kx, Sx, and Hx
are used to explore trade-offs. For example,
Geronimus et al. (1997) suggest that teen
births to socioeconomically disadvantaged
women do not represent loss of social capi-
tal, because these births to teenagers typi-
cally represent whole-family decisions, not
teenage rebellions, and kin networks allow
sharing of both costs of childcare and risks
of mortality (cf. Burton, 1990; Stack, 1974,
1996). Under what conditions will this oc-
cur? Using Model 2, several questions are
Fig. 1. In Model 2, there are nine levels of physical capital (Kx treated here as roughly equivalent to socioe-
conomic status). There are two levels of social capital (Sx) within each physical capital level (1 = intact family; 2 =
impaired social or familiar network); five human capital (Hx: education) levels (elementary, middle school, high
school, college, and post-college); and seven ages, each of the first six approximately 6 years long (0 = birth through
early elementary school; 1 = elementary school; 2 = junior high school and high school; 3 = college age, 4 = post-
college age (late 20s); 5 = early 30s; (6 = late 30s; 7 = over 40). Thus a women may occupy more than 900 states.
These states are described by a 5-digit string, in which position 1 = age, position 2 = social capital, position 3 =
human capital level, position 4 = physical capital (1–9), and position 5 = fertility (0 = no child, 1 = child). Here the
possible life paths are shown for a girl born into physical capital level 3, social capital level 2. Note that in some
states, either two values exist for, e.g., physical capital, or all values are the same, but one is a new condition
(reflected by bold and underlined type); these result when a womans condition differs depending on the path she
followed (e.g., giving birth, then returning to school, versus continuing to school and giving birth later).
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explored. First, when women gain in phys-
ical capital by delaying reproduction for
human capital (and their daughters are
assigned the increased level), what are the
relative rates of growth for women who de-
lay fertility for the sake of education but
nonetheless have as many children as oth-
ers? When physical capital affects both
mortality (poverty increased age-specific
mortality) and fertility (both the very
wealthy and the very poor have fewer chil-
dren than middle-status women), how does
the distribution of women and physical
capital change?
Empirical data
To examine womens trade-offs between
education and fertility empirically, data are
used from the PSID, a longitudinal dataset
that began in 1968 with a nationally repre-
sentative sample of 5,000 U.S. households.
Individuals from the original sample of
households have been re-interviewed annu-
ally; people who leave core households to
form new households are also followed, in-
cluding spouses who divorced as well as
children and grandchildren who have grown
up. In 1990, the sample was refreshed with a
representative national sample of 2,000 La-
tino households. The PSID is collected and
maintained by the Survey Research Center
of the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan. Currently, all data
from 1968 through 1993 are publicly avail-
able, and may be downloaded from http://
www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/.
Each annual wave of the PSID collects
core data on income sources and amounts,
employment, family composition changes,
and demographic events. Beginning in
1985, the PSID began collecting compre-
hensive retrospective fertility and marriage
histories of individuals in the sample
households. For 3,902 women ages 45 and
older, these data are used to examine the
following relationships: lifetime reproduc-
tive success, the probability of not having
children, the age at first birth, educational
attainment, birth cohort, and ethnicity.
RESULTS
Model 1: Trade-offs in lx, mx, and age at
first reproduction
The power of generation time is starkly
evident in the first runs. When equal
numbers of women are compared who share
the same mortality schedule and have
identical total fertility, but different birth
schedules, the youngest-reproducing wom-
en quickly swamp the other populations.
Furthermore, even when most daughters
are quite likely to switch to later fertility
schedules than their mothers, after 750
years, 90% of the population are early-re-
producers, and most women (61%) in the
population, no matter what their own re-
productive timing, are derived from foun-
dresses with early fertility.
Coale (1974), using total fertility rate, life
expectancy, and annual birth rate, noted
that many combinations of fertility and
mortality can generate a population in
equilibrium. Trade-offs differ in growing or
declining populations, however. For exam-
ple, as Roff (1992, p. 240) noted, when the
rate of increase is high, selection acts more
strongly on time to maturity than on fe-
cundity. This is an observation relevant to
family planning programs in developing
nations with currently high rates of in-
crease.
In Fig. 2, three population growth/decline
rates are shown for four groups of women.
In the runs generating these curves, all
mortality is either pre-reproductive or long
post-reproductive and the only difference
across groups is the (somewhat unrealistic)
condition that all reproduction (mx) in a
group is concentrated into one of four age
periods (16–20, 21–25, 26–30, and 31–35
years). Two things should be clear, and both
are relevant to issues of population patterns
in developed versus developing nations to-
day. First, the farther r departs from zero,
the more divergent are the combinations of
lx (survivorship at age x) and mx (fertility at
age x) that generate comparable r values,
for women who reproduce at different ages
(the more spread out are the curves). In
rapidly growing populations, for example, a
greater shift in mortality is required to off-
set a specific difference in age-specific fer-
tility than in population close to equilibrium
(see also Roff 1992, p.240). At r=0, all curves
converge to become one, and at equilibrium,
the population has a stable and stationary
age distribution.
Second, not only do the curves as a group
shift (Fig. 2a–c) at different r values, but
their order shifts. In a population increas-
ing by 5% (Fig. 2a), consider those with an
mx of 1.6: the group of women reproducing
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in ages 16–20 years have an lx (in the pre-
reproductive age group) of 0.76. For the 31–
to 35-year-old reproducers to meet the same
rate of increase with the same mx of 1.6,
their lx would have to be 0.88. Similarly,
when late- and early-reproducing women
have similar survivorship (here, lx = l), the
late-reproducing women (31–40) must have
1.16 daughters for every daughter produced
by a woman who reproduces at age 16–24
years.
Conversely, when the population is de-
creasing by 5% (Fig. 2c), the relative posi-
tions of 16-year-old reproducers and 31 to
35-year-old reproducers are reversed (see
Fisher 1958, who commented on the shift in
reproductive value in increasing and de-
creasing populations). Thus, in increasing
populations, women who delay reproduction
must have markedly higher fertility or far
better survivorship that women who repro-
duce early, in order to generate the same
contribution to population growth. In de-
clining populations, late-reproducers de-
cline more slowly than early reproducers.
Model 2: Additional currencies, life paths,
and population patterns
The most striking result from this model
was how extreme the effects of social, hu-
man, and physical capital must be in order
to counter the advantages of early repro-
duction demonstrated in Model 1. In Model
2, comparisons within levels of physical
capital (Kx) levels showed that early-repro-
ducing women left the most descendants,
generation after generation. However edu-
Fig. 2. As populations diverge from equilibrium,
trade-offs in fertility and mortality become more ex-
treme, and age-specific responses matter more. Here,
mx is concentrated in one of the following periods:
16–20, 21–25, 26–30, and 31–35; lx is less than 1.0 only
in the 0–5 and 70 age groups. These are iso-r curves:
at any point along a given curve, that combination of lx
and mx for women reproducing in that age group will
result in the same value of r. The curves become iden-
tical when r = 0, and the order of the curves reverses,
depending on whether r is <0 or >0 (Fisher, 1958). The
more rapidly a population is expanding (the greater is r
> 0), the more children must be produced by women
who waited to reproduce, in order to match each child
borne by a woman who reproduces early. See text for
further discussion.
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cation (human capital) and socioeconomic
status (roughly, physical capital) could in-
fluence both age-specific mortality and fer-
tility.
Interactions of social, human, and physi-
cal capital influenced both age-specific fer-
tility and age-specific mortality in Model 2.
Conditions exist under which delaying re-
production (Roff, 1992) could be profitable,
but these are constrained. As is true gen-
erally (and for Model 1, with appropriate
parameter values), late-reproducers in de-
clining (r < 0) populations do not see their
lineages decrease as rapidly as those of
early reproducers; this is hardly of interest
to us here. In one set of runs of Model 2, the
three lowest physical capital levels suffered
very high mortality rates (30–50%) at every
age. Beginning with newborns in K3, sur-
viving women gave birth: all in age group 2,
all in age group 3, all in age group 4, or all
in age group 5. Lifetime fertility was set
sufficiently high (1.6 daughters) to allow a
positive r for the total population. Women
who survived to give birth in age group 2, 3,
or 4 could not escape the high mortality of
lower income groups, but women who de-
layed birth until after college age (and
many of these attended college) could move
to Kx levels (4 and above) with attendant
high survivorship. These women––and only
these women––had rapidly growing sub-
population numbers and wealth. The com-
bination of very high mortality and early
fertility for low education and socioeco-
nomic categories, versus very low mortality
for high educational and socioeconomic
status, produced a gain for women who de-
layed reproduction. This is a tempting ave-
nue to explore; however, empirical data
(Geronimus, 1996b, 1997; Geronimus et al.,
1996, 1997) suggest that this is a very dif-
ficult path for poor urban women in the
United States.
In Fig. 3A, mortality varies with both Kx
and Sx levels, particularly for younger ages.
Increased Hx (education) both delays fertil-
ity and increases physical capital level at
the completion of school. Women with more
physical capital have better survivorship
than others, but tend to give birth later;
women with lower social capital (S1) have,
within each level, slightly lower fertility
than women with S2. All women have 1.1
daughters. With these constraints, r = 1.08,
and after 40 rounds (roughly 200 years),
wealthier women comprised an increasing
proportion of the population: women with
the three highest levels of physical capital
comprised 50% of the population (most in
levels 7 and 8). These women controlled
over 70% of the existing physical capital,
which had increased by about 50%. They
increase in part because women who go to
school (and thus increase their later phy-
sical capital) have upward mobility (and
collect in higher levels of physical capi-
tal)––and daughters are assigned the levels
of their mothers upon birth. So the model
produced somewhat high degrees of upward
mobility.
Figure 3B introduces age-specific fertility
reflecting data for white U.S. women, by
education, from the PSID; women with less
physical capital (and less education) not
only have earlier fertility, but higher total
fertility. In the runs of Fig. 3b, women with
K3 and S2 had a total of 1.35 daughters.
With these constraints, r = l.01. After 40
rounds the population had increased by
29% while Kx had decreased by 4%; women
in the three poorest groups comprised more
than 50% of the population, but owned only
20% of the wealth.
Empirical data: The panel study of income
dynamics PSID
Women face life history trade-offs: ac-
quiring human and physical capital has
reproductive costs, similar to the trade-offs
between body size and age of sexual matu-
rity observed in non-market societies and
nonhuman animals. Models 1 and 2 give
some general support to that notion. But
how do women actually behave?
The empirical evidence is clear that
women in the United States do, in fact, be-
have as if such trade-offs exist. Lifetime
reproductive success varies across birth co-
horts and by race and ethnicity; some of the
results presented here ignore these effects,
although the multivariate analyses pre-
sented at the end of the section control for
these important confounds. All analyses are
restricted to women age 45 years and older.
There are strong observed trade-offs be-
tween lifetime reproductive success (de-
fined as the number of live births) and the
age at first birth and first marriage (Fig. 4).
Delaying first birth from age 15 to age 30 or
age 45 years results in a concomitant re-
duction of lifetime fertility of approximately
2.1 and 3.8 children, respectively, while
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Fig. 3. Results of two runs of Model 2. (A) Mortality varies with both Kx and Sx levels, particularly for younger
ages, following the literature for guidance. Increased Hx (education) both delays fertility and increases physical
capital level after the completion of school. Women with more physical capital have better survivorship, but tend to
give birth later; women with lower social capital (S1) have, within each level, slightly lower fertility than women
with S2. All women, regardless of socioeconomic state or age at reproduction have 1.1 daughters, (B) Women with
less physical capital (and less education) not only have earlier fertility, but higher total fertility; this is perhaps
slightly more like the real world.
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similar delays in the age at first marriage
decreases lifetime fertility by 1.5 and 2.4
children, respectively. From a fertility per-
spective, then, there are important costs to
delaying the onset of reproduction.
Tables 1–3 present further evidence of
this trade-off. Lifetime reproductive success
among women in the PSID sample varies by
birth cohort, with women born before 1920
(whose peak fertility years occurred during
the Depression and WWII) and women born
after 1945 (the oldest of the baby boomers)
having the lowest fertility (Table 1). There
are also significant effects of educational
attainment: fertility decreases with each
incremental level of education, an effect
that is seen within cohorts as well as across
them. Women clearly trade off education
and fertility.
Across cohorts, the age at first birth de-
creases, reaching a minimum for women
born in the 30s, and then increasing for later
cohorts (Table 2). Lower levels of education
(high school degree and below) have similar
ages of first birth; women with some college,
college degrees, or post-graduate education,
however, have increasingly delayed ages at
first birth. Women apparently do face trade-
offs between acquiring an education and
beginning their reproductive careers.
The proportion of women with no genetic
children varies by cohort and educational
Fig. 4. Lifetime reproductive success (here defined as number of live births) as a function of age at marriage and
age at first birth. Data from Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
TABLE 1. Lifetime reproductive success for women age 45 years and older, by highest education and birth cohort
(N = 3,902)











<1920 3.23 2.57 2.29 1.95 1.68 2.00 2.55
1920–24 4.00 4.16 3.20 2.43 2.82 1.76 3.36
1925–29 4.51 3.91 3.35 4.05 3.24 2.24 3.78
1930–34 4.27 4.58 3.25 3.16 2.55 2.00 3.60
1935–39 3.61 4.29 3.08 3.19 2.35 1.89 3.35
1940–44 3.66 3.23 2.67 2.15 2.15 1.66 2.09
1945–49 3.37 3.08 2.39 1.99 1.87 1.70 2.34
All cohorts 3.69 3.56 2.80 2.44 2.16 1.82 2.94
HS, high school.
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level (Table 3). As with total fertility and
age at first birth, women born in the earli-
est and latest cohorts are more likely not to
have any children than those in the
1925–1934 cohorts. For most cohorts, ac-
quiring an education is associated with in-
creased probability of having no children:
women with college degrees and beyond are
the most likely not to have any children.
However, for one cohort––women born in
the late 1920s, who are the mothers of many
of the baby boomers––there is a negative
relationship between childlessness and ed-
ucation, up through college graduates.
Women with postgraduate education, how-
ever, remained the most likely to be child-
less in this, and every, cohort.
These results suggest women do indeed
face trade-offs among acquiring education,
beginning their reproductive careers, and
their total reproductive success. In partic-
ular, women delay their first births––forego
reproduction altogether––in the pursuit of
education. Because these relationships are
confounded by race and by birth cohort ef-
fects, Table 4 presents multivariate models
that control for these background variables.
The first column presents a model of life-
time reproductive success, for women who
had at least one child. With respect to birth
cohort, there is an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship: relative to women born before
1920, women born in the 1920s and early
1930s have higher fertility, and women
born in the 1940s have lower fertility. His-
panic fertility is similar to that of non-His-
panic whites, whereas African Americans
have higher fertility (approximately 0.82
additional offspring). Women who were
married at least once have about 0.77 ad-
ditional genetic offspring. However, con-
sistent with the relationship plotted in
Figure 4, each additional years delay in the
age at first birth decreases womens lifetime
fertility. Educational attainment is treated
as a series of dummy variables, with the
baseline category being women with high
school degrees only. Controlling for lifetime
marital status and age at first birth, women
with less than a high school diploma have
significantly more children, whereas there
are no significant differences between
women with higher levels of education.
These results suggest that educations
influence on lifetime fertility (Table 1)
works through a delay in the age at first
birth (Table 2); once first birth is controlled
for, higher levels of education are not asso-
ciated with decreased lifetime fertility, at
least for women who had at least one child.
TABLE 3. Proportion of women age 45 years and older with no children, by highest education and birth cohort
(N = 3,831)











<1920 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.34 0.35 0.23
1920–24 0.19 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.16
1925–29 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.36 0.09
1930–34 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.09
1935–39 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.39 0.10
1940–44 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.11
1945–49 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.12
All cohorts 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.13
HS, high school.
TABLE 2. Age at first birth for parous women age 45 years and older, by highest education and birth cohort
(N = 3,339)









<1920 22.4 23.3 24.7 25.7 28.2 30.8 24.1
1920–24 21.8 22.9 24.1 26.3 26.1 27.5 23.9
1925–29 22.5 22.0 23.1 23.3 25.1 24.8 22.9
1930–34 21.6 19.7 22.3 23.4 24.6 23.7 22.0
1935–39 21.8 19.4 21.9 22.9 24.5 23.9 21.7
1940–44 22.8 20.3 21.9 23.0 24.9 24.3 22.3
1945–49 22.5 19.7 22.1 22.6 26.2 27.6 22.8
All cohors 22.3 21.0 22.7 23.5 25.9 26.5 22.9
HS, high school.
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The second half of Table 4 examines the
probability of women not having any ge-
netic offspring over the course of their lives.
Relative to women born before 1920, women
in all later cohorts are less likely to be
childless. Relative to non-Hispanic whites,
African American women are less likely not
to have children, whereas Hispanic women
are neither more nor less likely. The anal-
ysis also controlled for the total number of
years women were married between the
ages of 15 and 45 years. Each additional
year of marriage decreases the odds that a
woman remains childless. Unlike total fer-
tility for parous women, there are signifi-
cant effects of higher education on the
probability of not having any children. All
else being equal, women with some college
or with less than a high school degree are
neither more nor less likely to be childless
than women with high school degrees.
However, relative to women with high
school education, women with college de-
grees are 1.81 times as likely to be childless,
and women with post graduate education
are 2.96 times as likely not to have children.
The results suggest that women who ac-
quire higher levels of education delay their
ages of first birth, with consequent costs to
their lifetime reproductive success. Con-
trolling for the age of first birth, higher
levels of education do not affect overall fer-
tility for parous women, although the
highest levels of fertility are observed for
women with less than high school degrees.
By delaying the onset of fertility to obtain
higher degrees, however, women greatly
increase their probability of not having any
children at all. These results confirm that
women do face trade-offs between fertility
and education, and that there are fitness
costs to delaying the onset of their repro-
ductive careers.
DISCUSSION
George Williams, in his classic Adapta-
tion and Natural Selection (1966), laid out
the biologists (and, now, perhaps the de-
mographers and anthropologists) dilemma:
despite the simplicity of natural selections
rules, even for nonhuman species, how can
TABLE 4. Multivariate models of total lifetime fertility (for parous women) and the probability of having no genetic
offspring, for women age 45 years and older, using the PSID
Total lifetime fertility (OLS)
Probability of having no genetic offspring
(logistic)
Parameter P Parameter Odds ratio P




–– –– –– ––
Born 1920–1924 0.66 0.000 )0.36 0.69 0.069
Born 1925–1929 0.70 0.000 )1.10 0.33 0.000
Born 1930–1934 0.41 0.003 )1.13 0.32 0.000
Born 1935–1939 0.05 0.722 )1.14 0.32 0.000
Born 1940–1944 )0.39 0.004 )1.06 0.35 0.000
Born 1945–1949 )0.55 0.000 )1.28 0.28 0.000
Non-Hispanic white (reference
group)
–– –– –– –– ––
Hispanic 0.07 0.550 )0.12 0.89 0.557
African American 0.82 0.000 )0.34 0.71 0.027
Elementary school education 1.00 0.000 0.21 1.23 0.262
Some high school education 0.55 0.000 0.09 1.10 0.623
High school degree (reference
group)
–– –– –– –– ––
Some college 0.05 0.670 0.24 1.27 0.191
College graduate 0.17 0.293 0.59 1.81 0.010
Post graduate or professional
degree
0.13 0.453 1.08 2.96 0.000
Age at first birth )0.13 0.000 –– –– ––
Woman was ever married 0.77 0.002 –– –– ––
Total number of years married
(from ages 15–45 years)
–– –– )0.09 0.91 0.000
N = 2,643 N = 3,022
F[15,2627]=55.3 v2=353.4
R2 = .2401
P < 0.0001 P < 0.0001
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we best define success? Not by offspring
born––many may die before independence
or reproduction, rendering the parents ef-
forts inefficient. By grandchildren? How
difficult, even in many short-lived species.
As one imagines measures extending over a
longer period, other problems arise: popu-
lation numbers are difficult to interpret for
species that experience great fluctuations;
persistence through time measures some-
thing quite different––species such as
horseshoe crabs are, by this measure, emi-
nently successful.
Biologists have treated this heuristically:
they measure what is possible and logically
defensible as likely to contribute to lineage
success––genes identical by descent––over
time. Thus, a plethora of measures and in-
terpretations exists. Like the work of others
(e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Mace, 1993,
1996, 1998; Kaplan et al., 1995; Kaplan and
Lancaster, 2000; Rogers, 1990, 1991, 1995),
these simulations, and analysis of the PSID
data, suggest that there are special addi-
tional problems in examining human pop-
ulations, related to the human ability to
create new currencies, and to change rela-
tive advantages in different environments.
In the evolutionary history of all living
things, including humans, more has al-
ways been reproductively more profitable:
either more babies, or better-provi-
sioned––and thus more consumptive––ba-
bies. This distinction is crucial: for many
species in highly competitive or densely
populated environments, the most success-
ful reproductive tactic in many environ-
ments is not to make the maximum number
of offspring, but to make fewer, better-in-
vested offspring. If poorer parents cannot
substantially enhance their childrens suc-
cess, then large families, concentration of
resources in one or a few children, with
others leaving early (behavioral ecologists
would call this an alternate strategies
situation, demographers the Mediterrane-
an family pattern) might be expected.
Couples at the high end of the socioeco-
nomic ladder might do better by investing
more per child to make them competitive
with their peers (e.g., education, clothing,
status acquisitions; cf. Emlen, 1997). Evo-
lutionary anthropologists (Kaplan, 1996;
Kaplan et al., 1998; Kaplan and Lancaster,
2000), have analyzed the effects of cohort,
wealth, and markets on human fertility (see
also Stearns, 1992; Roff, 1992; Hill, 1993).
The next question, of course, is, under
what environments do each of these strat-
egies succeed, and when do they fail?
At first, the fertility and consumption
shifts that characterize developed nations
today look tantalizingly like low-ferti-
lity–high-investment parental competition
strategies. (Scholars estimate that a child
born in the United States today will con-
sume 15 times as much as a third-world
infant.) Rogers (1990, 1991, 1995) has
modeled aspects of such trade-offs. Socio-
logical studies (Knodel et al., 1990) also
suggest that parents may explicitly calcu-
late the number of children they can afford
to have, given the level of parental invest-
ment required to make those children de-
sirable in the labor market.
No environment is limitless. However, the
typical measure is numbers of individuals
over time, with the assumption (when this
problem is even considered) that variance in
lineage success and persistence lies there-
––in numbers. For other species, this is often
a reasonable assumption. Humans, howev-
er, have elaborated mechanisms of resource
acquisition and control to the point that they
have generated extreme variance, unknown
in other species, in the amount of resources
controlled per individual.
As a result of the simulations, another
way is apparent to consider the effect of
resource limits, or carrying capacity, on
human populations. Consider the product
(numbers · resources controlled) to compare
lineages. For humans, this term can have
considerable more variance in the re-
sources component compared to the
numbers component. This is clearly an
issue in the real world (Heilig, 1996; Cohen,
1995, 1998; MacKellar, 1996, 1997): the
number of people one calculates that the
worlds resources can support depends
largely on assumptions about per capita
consumption, and to some extent about as-
sumptions regarding equity of resource
distribution. This was the core of the argu-
ments between developed and developing
nations at the Rio Conference (See Low
et al., in press).
In terms of persistence through time one
measure biologists have used to measure
success, the effect of resources on human
lineage persistence may have been far
greater than for any other species, and far
greater than we have ever suspected. In
addition, although resources controlled per
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capita may not have much influence (even
though variance is high) in developed na-
tions today, the story in developing nations
may be different.
Furthermore, if resources become more
constricted in the future, access to limited
resources may not be even, or equitable (cf.
Hardin, 1968; Boone and Kessler, 1999). At
that point, resource allocation rules would
become crucial: if allocations go first to
richly endowed, high-consumption individ-
uals, the population composition at carrying
capacity has relatively few members of low-
endowment lineages. Thus, if them thats
got shall get (precisely the complaint of the
developing nations at the Rio Conference),
the number of individuals at equilibrium
will be relatively low, the poor will lose, and
our human preoccupation with resources
for their own sake may make more selective
sense than we have imagined (Low et al., in
press).
In traditional societies, wealth or status
principally affected a mans ability to get
mates (review by Low, 2000b). Offspring
survival was, in most cases, not affected by
a mans status. Data from western societies
today typically show a significant difference
in survival at many ages with measures of
income (Daly and Wilson, 1997), but fertil-
ity data are more mixed (Borherhoff Mul-
der, 1998; Low, 2000a,b). In the United
States, women trade off the acquisition of
human capital and fertility; women who
obtain higher levels of education have later
ages of first birth and are more likely to
remain childless.
Using simulations based on real-world
data, it is suggested that wealth may confer
two, and possibly three, demographic ad-
vantages. In some cases it leads, through
the proximate mechanism of comparison
with ones neighbors and peers, to greater
intended fertility by individuals who per-
ceive themselves as better off than their
reference group. Several works suggest that
couples make deliberate decisions about
family size in response to their judgment of
relative resources available and relative
well-being; when deliberately chosen family
sizes are considered, there is a correlation
between income and family size. When ac-
cidental pregnancies are considered, the
picture becomes less clear. Wealth can also
protect children from some exogenous mor-
tality (moving to safe neighborhoods), and
endow them with costly competitive ad-
vantages (Kaplan et al., 1995; Knodel et al.,
1990). Finally, if new resources are allo-
cated first and preferentially to already-
wealthy individuals, when resources be-
come limiting, lineage failures will occur
preferentially in poorer lineages. The first
two advantages do not, in most western
societies today, appear strong in terms of
lineage persistence. The third is, at this
point, speculative.
Finally, it is important to remember that
population patterns arise from individual
choices, and, as demographers know well,
human intentionality matters. First, meas-
uring even objective resources is, of course,
a difficult task. Adding social resources,
which may substitute for other physical and
human capital in some constrained condi-
tions, adds complexity. But objective meas-
ures may be less important in peoples
marriage and fertility choices than their
perceived wealth trajectory, perceived com-
parative wealth, or perceived social well-
being. For example, migrants from a rela-
tively poorer to a relatively richer area may
show fertility above native-born individuals
of the rich area; the trend, rather than ab-
solute value of resources, may be the rele-
vant consideration.
In these analyses, total fertility was held
equal across populations, and only mothers
and daughters were considered. Another
problem remains that clearly can influence
offspring survival and reproductive success:
patterns of investment across children. As
Charnov (1982) noted, investment in off-
spring should maximize the predicted re-
turn from offspring. Under conditions of
constricted resources, we might find very
unequal investment in children within a
family, with heightened investment in older
(closer to successful reproduction) sons,
whose success in most societies is more de-
pendent on resources than daughters (Low,
2000b). In the Swedish case, for example,
land was overwhelmingly given to the
oldest adult son, despite legal equal
inheritance; and land-owning men had
more children than their landless brothers.
Furthermore, not only are parental deci-
sions influenced by resource conditions
(Davis et al., 1999), but parental attempts
to invest equally may have quite contrary,
inequality-producing effects (Davis et al.,
1999). The model derived here is flexible
and could be modified for analysis of such
questions.
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In the life histories of other species, de-
layed maturation and late fertility are seen
only when these yield a net lineage repro-
ductive profit (Stearns, 1992; Roff, 1992);
optimal age at first reproduction is none-
theless not trivial to compute. When trade-
offs in human capital, resource acquisition
trajectory, and fertility costs are explicitly
modeled, the results can be complex.
For humans, it looks increasingly as
though the decline in fertility that has ac-
companied industrialization, shifts in edu-
cation, and changes in labor markets, is in
fact, suboptimal from a reproductive point
of view (cf. Borgerhoff Mulder, 1997;
Pérusse, 1993; Vining, 1986). Note, how-
ever, that most studies use a variety of
measures and proxies, and few recognize
that we may not be defining environments
and populations appropriately (see Low,
1993, 1999, 2000a; Hughes, 1988; Low and
Clarke, 1993; Low et al., 1992; Simon, 1974;
Freedman and Thornton, 1982; Johnson
and Lean, 1985). It is still not clear whether
the choices by a growing proportion of in-
dividuals to maximize physical resources, at
the cost of delayed and often lowered fer-
tility, are not simply maladaptive in a bio-
logical sense. Certainly the models
presented here suggest that this may be
true, depending on assumptions. However,
such models must be made far more realis-
tic and include more thorough considera-
tions of extrinsic unpredictabilities, before
this question can be addressed thoroughly.
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